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Neutral Citation Number:
Reported Number: R(IS)3/96
File Number: CIS 767 1993
Appellant:
Respondent:
Judge/Commissioner: Judge J. Mesher
Date Of Decision: 25/04/1995
Date Added: 25/07/2002
Main Category: Capital
Main Subcategory: Disregards: home and other premises
Secondary Category: Capital
Secondary Subcategory: Joint holdings
Notes: Capital - farm - whether farmland part of “premises” occupied by the claimant’s husband The claimant had lived on a farm of which she was the joint owner with her husband. On 2 July 1992 she went to live in a residential care home on a permanent basis. Her husband continued to live in the farmhouse. Income support was awarded from 2 July 1992. It was later established that the value of the farmland was about £35,000. The land was farmed by a partnership of the claimant’s husband and son; it was accepted that the land, which had its own access, could be sold separately from the farmhouse. The adjudication officer reviewed the decision awarding income support, deciding that although the value of the farmhouse could be disregarded under paragraph 4(b) of Schedule 10 to the Income Support (General) Regulations, the value of the farmland could not. The claimant was therefore not entitled to income support because her capital exceeded the prescribed limit of £8,000. The tribunal allowed the claimant’s appeal holding that the value of the claimant’s interest in the farm was nil as she would be unlikely to find a willing purchaser without her husband’s agreement to a sale. The adjudication officer appealed to the Commissioner. Held that: 1. “premises” in paragraph 4 of Schedule 10 to the Income Support (General) Regulations was to be interpreted in line with the definition of “dwelling occupied as the home” in regulation 2(1). The first four paragraphs of Schedule 10 were all concerned with disregarding the claimant’s home or what would be the home if the claimant was in actual occupation, and thus it was entirely consistent for “premises” in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 to be given a similar interpretation. The tribunal had therefore not erred in law by failing to apply paragraph 4 of Schedule 10 to the whole of the farm (paras. 17 and 18); 2. however the tribunal had erred in law by not considering regulation 52 of the Income Support (General) Regulations. The effect of regulation 52 was to deem the claimant to have an equal undivided share as beneficial tenant in common of the farm (see Chief Adjudication Officer v. Palfrey and para. 49 of CIS/391/1992[R(IS) 26/95]) (paras. 19 and 20); 3. although there were grounds for review of the decision to award income support because it was given in ignorance of the facts relating to the claimant’s beneficial interest in the farm, the adjudication officer had not shown that the decision to award the claimant income support should be revised (para. 29). The District Valuer’s valuation of the claimant’s interest seemed to have been based on the revenue approach which was inconsistent with the approach required by paragraphs 53 and 54 of CIS/391/1992 [R(IS) 26/95]. Moreover it was based on an assumption that an order for sale of the farm was likely to be granted but this seemed doubtful in the circumstances. Accordingly the adjudication officer had not shown that the claimant’s notional share of the farm had a market value which was sufficient to affect her entitlement to income support; 4. the claimant was therefore entitled to income support until her death on 2 February 1994.
Decision(s) to Download: Is03_96.doc Is03_96.doc