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Neutral Citation Number:	2012 UKUT 440 AAC
Reported Number:
File Number:	GIA 3037 2011
Appellant:	Dransfield v Information Commissioner
Respondent:
Judge/Commissioner:	Judge N J Wikeley
Date Of Decision:	14/05/2015
Date Added:	07/02/2013
Main Category:	Tribunal procedure and practice (including UT)
Main Subcategory:	statements of reasons
Secondary Category:	Information rights
Secondary Subcategory:	Freedom of Information - exceptions
Notes:	Reported with Court of Appeal decision as [2015] AACR 34. Freedom of Information Act 2000 – exceptions – section 14(1) – balancing exercise – how to identify a vexatious request In 2010 the appellant, Mr Dransfield, made a written request to the council under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) for information about a pedestrian bridge and its lightning protection system. The council refused his request as vexatious for the purposes of section 14(1) of FOIA in view of the volume and frequency of his previous correspondence about similar issues. The Information Commissioner (IC) upheld the council’s decision but Mr Dransfield’s appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (F-tT) was successful; it held that his current request was “benign” and was not a continuation of his previous requests. The IC appealed against that decision. The Upper Tribunal (UT) held that the F-tT had misapplied the legal test for establishing whether a request was “vexatious” within section 14(1) of FOIA. The conclusion in Lee v Information Commissioner and King’s College Cambridge EA/2012/0015, 0049 and 0085 was approved; ie that “vexatious” meant a “manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of a formal procedure”. The UT also held that it was wrong to impose a prescriptive, all encompassing, definition, but advised that vexatious cases may be identified by (1) the burden (on the public authority and its staff); (2) the motive (of the requester); (3) the value or serious purpose (of the request) and (4) any harassment or distress (of and to staff). Mr Dransfield appealed against that decision to the Court of Appeal and the issue before the court was whether a request can treated as vexatious if it is not itself vexatious but previous requests had been. Held, dismissing the appeal, that: 1. in defining “vexatiousness” the emphasis was on an objective standard. The starting point was whether there was a reasonable belief that the information sought would be of value to the requester, the public or any section of the public. The decision-maker should consider all the relevant circumstances so as to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request was vexatious. If a relevant motive could be discerned with a sufficient degree of assurance, it might be evidence from which vexatiousness could be inferred. If a requester pursues his rights out of vengeance it might be said that his actions were improperly motivated but also that his request was without any reasonable foundation. But this could not be the case if the request had been aimed at the disclosure of important information which ought to be made publicly available. A rounded approach was required and the relevant authority had to exercise its judgment in good faith in the light of all the information available to it (paragraphs 68 and 69); 2. the F-tT’s approach had been to distinguish between those requests which involved a common underlying grievance and those which did not. It was a distinction without logical justification or statutory mandate which might involve the disregarding of evidence that a request was vexatious. The UT had been entitled to find a link between the appellant’s past dealings with the council and his subsequent request (paragraphs 69).
Decision(s) to Download:	[2015] AACR 34ws.rtf