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Neutral Citation Number:	2012 UKUT 190 AAC
Reported Number:
File Number:	GIA 2986 2011
Appellant:	London Borough of Camden
Respondent:	The Information Commissioner & YV
Judge/Commissioner:	Judge E. Jacobs
Date Of Decision:	06/06/2012
Date Added:	19/07/2012
Main Category:	Information rights
Main Subcategory:	Freedom of information - qualified exemptions
Secondary Category:	Information rights
Secondary Subcategory:	Freedom of information - public interest test
Notes:	Reported as [2013] AACR 2. Freedom of information – qualified exemptions – prejudice to the prevention of crime – social and financial costs Freedom of information - public interest test – significance of other forms of accountability Mr V, the second respondent, applied to the Council under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 for a list of every void property in the Borough in which a non-individual was listed as either the owner or as having a material interest in it. The Council refused his request, initially on the basis of the exemption in section 43(2) of the 2000 Act but later, on review, on the basis of sections 12(1) and 21(1). The appellant applied to the Commissioner whereupon the Council relied on the basis of the exemption in section 31(1)(a). (It withdrew the previous exemptions.) The Commissioner upheld the Council’s decision and Mr V then exercised his right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (F-tT). The F-tT upheld the appeal; it decided that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the public interest in maintaining the exemption for information that would be prejudicial to the prevention of crime. The Council applied for permission to appeal. A F-tT Judge refused the Council’s application and amended the F-tT’s decision by removing the words “public” and “Council” under the slip rule: rule 40 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 SI 2009/1976. The Council renewed its application to the UT and permission to appeal was given by a UT judge. Held, allowing the appeal, that: 1. the F-tT misdirected itself on the scope of its enquiry by narrowly focusing on the nature of the criminal damage and its immediate consequences. Its task was to make an assessment of the public interest, including the social and financial consequences of a crime, not just the immediate financial costs. In performing its task the F-tT should take account of both those financial and social costs sufficiently connected to the interests involved to be part of that assessment, including costs arising from crime prevention, evictions, repairs, insurance premiums and the impact on local property values (paragraphs 7 to 12); 2. the F-tT must also consider when assessing the public interest whether or not criminal behaviour might change after the information has been disclosed and cannot simply assume it will remain the same; disclosure might change behaviour. The tribunal must assess the likelihood of prejudice to the public interest and cannot limit that assessment by making assumptions one way or the other (paragraphs 13 and 14); 3. the F-tT erred in law by misdirecting itself on the significance of other forms of accountability. Its task was to apply section 2(2)(b) of the 2000 Act and take account of the factors relevant to the public interest whether in maintaining the exemption or in favour of disclosure. The tribunal must assess the nature and extent of any other forms of accountability and this can only be done in the context of the particular case (paragraphs 15 to 19); 4. previous decisions are of persuasive authority and the tribunal was right to value consistency in decision-making. However paying too close a regard to previous decisions also has its dangers; it can elevate issues of fact into issues of law or principle and, as in this case, it can lead to statements being taken out of their context and given a general significance (paragraphs 20); 5. rule 40 (the slip rule) may be used to correct clerical mistakes and accidental slips or omissions but it cannot be used to cover matters which the judge had planned but failed to mention or where the tribunal has since changed its mind (paragraphs 21 to 26). The judge set aside the tribunal’s decision and remitted the case to a differently constituted panel for rehearing
Decision(s) to Download:	GIA 2986 2011-00.doc [2013] AACR 2ws.doc