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Neutral Citation Number:	2015 UKUT 251 AAC
Reported Number:
File Number:	HM 2224 2014
Appellant:	KD
Respondent:	A Borough Council, the Department of Health and Others
Judge/Commissioner:	Mr Justice Charles
Date Of Decision:	18/05/2015
Date Added:	09/06/2015
Main Category:	Mental health
Main Subcategory:	All
Secondary Category:
Secondary Subcategory:
Notes:	Reported as [2015] AACR 41. Mental health – discharge from guardianship – approach to be taken by First-tier Tribunal The appellant’s short-term memory loss left him unable to manage his daily life. He was detained in hospital under the Mental Health Act 1983 before being made the subject of guardianship and transferred to a residential care home. The appellant applied for discharge of the guardianship arguing that it was unnecessary, less restrictive arrangements being available under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and too restrictive as he was subject to 24-hour supervision and support. The First-tier Tribunal (F-tT) rejected the application, deciding that guardianship was necessary and represented the least restrictive option consistent with safeguarding the appellant’s welfare. The appellant appealed against that decision. Among the issues before the Upper Tribunal (UT) was whether the appellant was subject to a deprivation of his liberty which, as part of the least restrictive available option, could and should be authorised under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and its Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS) standard authorisation following a discharge of the guardianship. Held, ruling that the tribunal had erred in law, but not setting aside its decision, that: 1. the 2005 Act did not confer on a Guardian an express power equivalent to an injunction to prevent a patient leaving his place of residence or to dictate the terms of a care plan. However, the combination of the express powers conferred on the Guardian and section 18(3) of the 1983 Act had the following practical effects: (a) in choosing where the patient was to live, the Guardian would have regard to, and might require a commitment from the provider of the placement in respect of, the terms of the care plan and its restrictions; (b) if the care plan were changed, the Guardian could require the patient to live elsewhere; (c) the patient was required to live at a certain place under a care regime; (d) by requiring the patient to live at a given place a Guardian was at least indirectly requiring him to live there under those conditions and restrictions, albeit that he could not impose them on the provider of the care or treatment; it was the care plan not the guardianship that was the basis of a deprivation of liberty: NL v Hampshire County Council [2014] UKUT 475 (AAC); (e) the power to return the patient to his place of residence had the effect of a requirement or an injunction preventing him from leaving. That power was a more readily available, effective and sensible means of enforcing the result that the patient lived at a certain place than an injunction, the enforcement of which was problematic (paragraphs 30 to 31); 2. engaging the jurisdiction of the F-tT to discharge a guardianship under section 72 of the 1983 Act did not require a move from a deprivation of liberty to a restriction of liberty or less. The Guardian’s powers were to the exclusion of any other person; that meant that the Court of Protection could not override those powers: C v Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council [2011] EWHC 3321 (COP). Therefore the Court of Protection could only consider a care plan at a placement where the Guardian required the person to live and so any authorisation of a deprivation of liberty given by the court could only relate to that placement (paragraphs 44 to 47); 3. the F-tT had no jurisdiction to authorise or otherwise render lawful a deprivation of a person’s liberty during and after discharge of his guardianship. In exercising its statutory discretion it had to take account of practically available, and hence lawful, options. It should not discharge a guardianship if the consequence of doing so would be to bring about an unlawful deprivation of liberty. The UT considered the appropriate approach to applications such as the appellant’s and provided detailed guidance for F-tTs (paragraphs 55 to 73); 4. it was not clear what lawful alternative arrangements had been available for the appellant and therefore an adjournment of the F-tT would have been the best outcome. However, on the basis of the available evidence, the F tT had been entitled to conclude that the continuation of the guardianship was the least restrictive available option. It erred only in discussing whether the guardianship should be discharged if a lawful alternative might have been or become available but that was not sufficient to found a discharge (paragraphs 74 to 90); 5. the appropriate course was for the appellant’s discharge from guardianship to be dealt with on a new application to the F-tT, supported by appropriate evidence and arguments (paragraphs 91 to 94).
Decision(s) to Download:	[2015] AACR 41ws.doc