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Neutral Citation Number:	2012 UKUT 444 AAC
Reported Number:
File Number:	JR 2617 2011
Appellant:	CICA v First-tier Tribunal and TS
Respondent:	CICP/First-tier Tribunal and TS
Judge/Commissioner:	Judge H. Levenson
Date Of Decision:	03/02/2014
Date Added:	07/01/2013
Main Category:	Criminal Injuries Compensation
Main Subcategory:	claims
Secondary Category:
Secondary Subcategory:
Notes:	Court of Appeal decision reported as [2014] AACR 27. Criminal injuries compensation – meaning of phrase “crime of violence” for the purposes of Scheme The claimant, a 14 year old boy, was riding his bicycle (apparently on the pavement) when a dog escaped from a garden and started barking at him. The claimant swerved into the road to avoid it and was hit by a car and seriously injured. A prosecution against the dog’s owner under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 was discontinued after she relinquished ownership of the dog. The claimant’s claim for compensation to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (CICA) was rejected on the basis that his injuries were not “directly attributable to a crime of violence”. The First-tier Tribunal (F-tT) upheld the claimant’s appeal and awarded him compensation: it found that the dog had been aggressive and that the claimant’s injuries were directly attributable to a crime of violence. CICA applied for judicial review of that decision. The Upper Tribunal (UT) dismissed the application: it held that whether a particular offence was a crime of violence was a question of law, that an offence under section 3 of the 1991 was a crime of violence and that, in the absence of a conviction, whether an offence had been committed was a question of fact for the F-tT to decide. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the claimant’s injuries were directly attributable to a crime of violence. Held, allowing the appeal, that: 1. the F-tT was right to find that an offence under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 had been committed, a reasonable finding of fact not open to review by either the UT or the Court (paragraph 22); 2. in establishing whether an offence was a crime of violence it was critical to distinguish between the nature of the crime and its consequences, even if they might reasonably have been foreseen. In the instant case the dog had not been deliberately released – at worst the owner was negligent. This would not constitute a crime of violence, given that expression’s ordinary meaning, and an offence did not become a crime of violence just because it resulted in injury to a person: see R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex parte Webb [1987] QB 74 (paragraph 23); 3. the UT and the F-tT had both erred; they concentrated on the consequences of the crime, not on its essential nature. Whether a crime of violence was committed was dependant on the particular circumstances of the case. The fact that the dog was known to be aggressive was not sufficient to enable the offence to be characterised as a crime of violence, any more than would be the case of an unfenced machine known to be dangerous (paragraph 24).
Decision(s) to Download:	JR 2617 2011-00.doc [2014] AACR 27bv.rtf